Delay announcements informing customers about anticipated service delays are prevalent in service-oriented systems.
Introduction
Delay announcements that inform customers about anticipated delays are prevalent in service systems. Call centers often use recorded announcements to inform callers of the congestion in the system and encourage them to wait for an available agent. While some of these announcements do not provide much information -such as the common message, "Due to high volume of calls, we are unable to answer your call immediately," some call centers go as far as providing the customer with an estimate of his waiting time or his place in the queue. In many service systems where the real state of the system is invisible to customers, delay announcements will affect customers' behavior and may, in turn, have significant impact on system * We are thankful for comments by the participants of Mini-conference on customer-oriented operations models at Olin Business School. Also, we are grateful to Martin Lariviere, Jim Dana and Peter Eso for long discussions on the paper. be shown, the announcements do have an impact on the service provider's profits and the customers' utility, in equilibrium. This is in agreement with both the cheap talk literature (See Crawford and Sobel (1982) ) and the queueing literature with strategic customers (See Naor (1969) , where the information provided to the customer in the form of full visibility of the queue does not alter the customers utility directly; it allows him to make a knowledgeable decision whether to join or not, and thus affects his utility in a indirect manner).
Our model echos the framework developed by Crawford and Sobel (1982) but the specifics of our model are different from theirs in some significant aspects. We explain these differences more closely in Section 1.2. This paper focuses on is dealing with the strategic interaction between the customer and the firm in a setting in which their incentives are misaligned, when unverifiable, costless, and non-binding information is provided to the customer. In all of the instances described in this paper, the information is always unverifiable and has no contractual bearing (that is, it is non-binding). This is in contrast to service-level guarantees, such as those made by Dominos Pizza, Ameritrade, and E * trade to name a few, (see Allon and Federgruen (2007) for a more detailed discussion of the announcement of these firms) where the commitment is both contractually binding and verifiable.
Our main findings are as follows:
(i) We characterize the equilibrium of the game played by the service provider and the customers. The characterization depends both on the queueing dynamics (based on a Markov Decision Process), and the strategic nature of the players. We show that, while the characterization is complex, under pure strategies, an equilibrium can be mapped into a single threshold level. The service provider suggests that customers balk if the queue length exceeds a certain threshold, and join otherwise, and the customers indeed follow the recommendation.
(ii) We show that different types of misalignment may lead to existence or non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria. When an equilibrium exits, we contrast it with the first-best from the customer's perspective, which we will refer to as full-information, and the first-best with respect to the service provider, which will be referred to as full-control. We identify four regions defined with respect to the full-information and the full-control solutions. Further, we characterize a two-signal equilibria when it exists, and show that any equilibrium with more than two signals is outcome-equivalent to the simpler two-signal ones. Some commonly used non-quantifiable announcements regarding the the congestion level in the system can be reduced to a two-signal equilibrium.
(iii) We show that even if the customers are allowed to randomize between multiple actions (i.e., join or balk), any equilibrium with more than two-signals will be outcome-equivalent to the two-signal equilibrium.
Furthermore, there cannot exist equilibria where customers balk with probability 1 and join with probability 1, given the appropriate signals.
(iv) We prove that there always exists a most informative equilibrium; i.e., an equilibrium with the finest partition of the state space revealed to the customer by the service provider. The firm employs intentional vagueness in this equilibrium, except when the customers and the firm are perfectly aligned. The role of intentional vagueness is to lure customers to join the system in states in which, under full information, the customer would not join. The informative equilibria, either with or without intentional vagueness, is shown to be equivalent to the common practices of announcing the location in the queue, an estimate on the average waiting time, or a confidence interval on the average waiting time.
(v) We show that a pure strategies babbling equilibrium may exists only under certain conditions on the relative value of the service when compared to the waiting time under rational expectations. Furthermore, we show that even if such an equilibrium arises, the service provider as well as the customers always prefer the other, more informative, equilibria.
Our main managerial implications for managers and service providers are as follows. First, we show that it is vital to model the strategic nature of the interaction between customers and service provider. In the absence of an adequate model -the firm might be making announcements without improving its profits since customers interpret them to their own benefits. Second, we provide a framework that can be used to develop more complex announcements a way to improve profits without using pricing tools (or when the latter are not possible), as well as to evaluate the effectiveness of various delay announcements. Moreover, we show that it is in the best interest of the firm to develop some consistent state-dependent language with the customer. In certain settings, which will be explicitly and mathematically stated in the paper, we suggest a simple signaling rule (consisting of two signals) that will enable the service provider to achieve its first-best profits.
Organization of remainder of the paper The rest of this section is divided into two parts: the first reviews the antecedent literature and the second describes briefly the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game. Section 2 provides the detailed description of our model. In Section 3 we define our notion of equilibrium and state our main results for pure-strategy equilibria. Section 4 then covers mixed strategies. In Section 5 we discuss the signaling language that emerges in equilibrium and, in particular, introduce and analyze the notion of most informative equilibria. Section 6 discusses the issue of abandonments and also provides a numerical study on an iterative scheme where the customer adapt their belief about the messages. In this section we also contrast our results with the findings of classical cheap talk literature. Concluding remarks and directions for future research are given in Section 7. All the the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Literature Review
Queueing models with strategic customers. The literature on queueing models with strategic customers began with Naor (1969) , who studied a system in which strategic customers observe the length of the queue prior to making the decision whether to join or balk. There is a (partial) conflict of interest between the selfinterested customer and the interests of the social-welfare-maximizing service provider. Naor (1969) shows that pricing can be used to achieve the first-best solution. The follow-up literature that extends Naor (1969) can be broadly divided into two: one that studies models where the firm offers different grades of services (see Mendelson and Whang (1990) and the recent paper by Afeche (2004) ), and the other that focuses on competition in the presence of congestion-sensitive customers (see Cachon and Harker (2002) and the recent paper by Allon and Federgruen (2007) ). All of papers above assume that, when announcements are made by the firm, they provide long-run averages information, (rather than real-time information), are credible, and are treated as such by customers.
Queueing models with delay announcements. Hassin (1986) studies the problem of a price-setting revenue-maximizing service provider that has the option to reveal the queue length to arriving customers, but may choose not to disclose this information, thus leaving the customers to decide whether to join the queue on the basis of the known distribution of the waiting times. The author shows that it may be-but not always-socially optimal to prevent suppression of information, and that it is never optimal to encourage suppression when the revenue maximizer prefers to reveal the queue length. Armony and Maglaras (2004b) analyze a service system where arriving customers can decide whether to join, balk, or wait for the provider to call within a guaranteed time. The customers' decisions are based on the equilibrium waiting time (which is equivalent to not providing any information). Armony and Maglaras (2004a) extend the above model to allow the service manager to provide the customers an estimate of the delay, based on the state of the system upon their arrival. The authors show that providing information on the estimated delay improves the system performance. Armony et al. (2007) study the performance impact of making delay announcements to arriving customers who must wait before starting service in a many-server queue setting with customer abandonment. Customers who must wait are told upon arrival either the delay of the last customer to enter service or an appropriate average delay. Two approximations are proposed: (i) the equilibrium delay in a deterministic fluid model and (ii) the equilibrium steady-state delay in a stochastic model with fixed delay announcements. The authors show that within the fluid-model framework, under certain conditions, the actual delay coincides with the announced delay. Dobson and Pinker (2006) develop a stochastic model of a custom production environment with pricing, where customers have different tolerances for waiting. The authors model intermediate levels of information sharing (with a specific structure) ranging from none to complete state-dependent lead-time information, and compare performance from the firms and customers perspectives. They show that for this specific structure it is not always the case that sharing information improves the profits of the firm. Guo and Zipkin (2007) study a model in which customers are provided with information and make decisions based on their expected waiting times, conditional on the provided information. Three types of information are studied: (i) no information, (ii) queue length, and (iii) the exact waiting time (in systems in which such information is available). The authors provide examples in which accurate delay information improves or hurts the system performance. Jouini et al. (2007) is the first paper to consider delay announcement in a multiple-customer class setting with priorities. The authors compute the expected value and variance of the delay and propose that, in practice, one could announce delay information according to a certain partition of the time rather than giving a very precise expected delay which may have little to do with the actual delay experienced by customers due to variability. All of these models assume that the information provided to the customer is truthful and that he believes it, even if he will be better off, in terms of his own utility, disregarding it. Kumar et al. (1997) examine the impact of the institution of a waiting time guarantee on customers' waiting experiences. In a related paper, Ho (2004) develop a market-share model to capture the impact of delivery-time commitment and delivery quality on the firms market share in the presence of congestion effects. Su and Zhang (2007) study availability guarantees in a newsvendor-type model and compare the resulting equilibrium to no-information and full-information equilibria. All these papers deal with guarantees, which by definition, are verifiable by the customers.
Classical Cheap Talk Game
In this section, we provide an overview of the cheap talk game introduced in Crawford and Sobel (1982) and compare the model to the one studied in this paper. The classical cheap talk game is played between a sender who has some private information and a receiver who takes the payoffs-relevant actions. The game proceeds as follows: The Sender observes the state of the world, which we shall denote by Q. While Crawford and Sobel (1982) uses the term "types", we shall follow Krishna and Morgan (2001) and use the terms "state-of-the-world" for reasons that will be clear later. The Sender then sends a signal (or a message) denoted by m ∈ M. (Here M denotes the set of all signals that can be used by the Sender.) The Receiver, who cannot observe the state of the world Q, but does know its distribution, processes the signal (using Bayes rule) and chooses an action y which determines the players payoff. Both the Sender and the Receiver obtain utilities which depend on: (a) the action taken by the Receiver, y; and (b) the state of the world Q.
Two distinctive features of their model should be emphasized: first, the state of the world, while random, is static: once realized it does not change over time. Also, the distribution of this state is exogenous and independent of the actions of the players. 2 Driven by the applications in service operations, our model has two novel features: first, the game is played with multiple receivers (customers) whose actions have externalities on other receivers; and second, 2 A variety of papers study mixed-motive economic interaction involving private information and the impact of cheap talk on the outcomes. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) study cheap talk in bargaining; in political context cheap talk has been studied in multiple papers including Austen-Smith (1990) , and Matthews (1989) . the stochasticity of the state-of-the-world (i.e., the state of the system) is not exogenously given but is determined endogenously. In particular, the private information in this model (i.e., the queue length) is driven by the system dynamics, which in turn depend on the equilibrium strategies of both the firm and the customers. In particular, in our model, the customers' action are payoff-relevant as well as system-dynamicrelevant. As we shall see, the multiplicity of receivers with externalities as well as the endogenization of the uncertainty impact both the nature of the communication as well as the outcome for the various players.
Hence, while the framework used in this paper echoes the cheap-talk model described in the literature, the above mentioned distinguishing features leads to different results. The way these features separate our results from those of Crawford and Sobel (1982) will be discussed in Section 6.3.
Model
We consider a service provider, modeled as an M/M/1 queue. Customers arrive to the system according to a Poisson process with rate λ. Service times are exponentially distributed with mean 1/µ. We assume that λ < µ. We assume that all customers are ex-ante symmetric: customers obtain a value R if they are served, and incur a waiting cost that is proportional to the time spent in the system, with a unit waiting cost of c.
Thus, the utility function of a customer is:
where y is the decision made by the customer and w denotes his sojourn time in the system. Throughout the paper, we shall assume that R > c/µ. This assumption ensures that in absence of delays, the service is beneficial to the customer, on average. Clearly, if R < c/µ, no customer will join regardless of the system announcements.
The firm's profit from a customer served is v > 0. The firm incurs a holding cost h(w) per customer who waits w in the system. Thus, the firm's profit from a customer is v − h(w) for a customer who received service from the firm and spent w in the system and is 0 for the customer who decides not to join. Here h is a convex increasing function, and v − Eh(X) > 0, where X is an exponential random variable with mean 1/µ. We assume that the customers who join the system are served in First-Come-First-Served manner.
Information Provision and Sequence of Events. All of the static structure described above is assumed to be common knowledge. The real-time state of the system, corresponding to the number of customers waiting in queue, is the firm's private information. The evolution of this state will depend on the equilibrium strategies of both the provider and the customer. The interaction between the customers and the firm can be described as follows: When a customer arrives to the system the firm, that can observe the queue length, announces a message to this customer. The customer reacts to that signal by deciding whether to join or not join (balk). This customer's decision is made based on the information that he can infer from the system manager regarding the current state of the system, denoted by I, in order to maximize its expected utility.
Therefore the customer will join, if and only if R ≥ cE(w|I). The type of signals that are used by the firm, and the way the customers interpret these to make their joining decision will be described precisely in the next section.
Note that the customer's and the service provider's incentives are not completely misaligned: both prefer short waiting times, which result in higher utility for the customer and higher profits for the service provider.
At the same time, we observe that the incentives are not perfectly aligned and this would lead to the equilibria described in the next section. We refer the reader to Farrell and Rabin (1996) for a discussion of settings in which incentives are perfectly misaligned. We will define the concept of misalignment in Section 3.
Main Results

Problem formulation
In this section we formally define the game between the service provider and the customers. The equilibrium concept we employ is one of Markov Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (MPBNE), which, in this case, is simply a Nash equilibrium in the decision rules that relate agents' actions to their information and to the situation in which they find themselves, while allowing for actions to depend only on payoff-relevant histories.
In practice, one observes different types of messages that are conveyed to the customers. These messages could provide tangible information such as expected wait in the queue or the position of the customer in the queue. Also, in some cases, the message may only have intangible information such as the congestion level or volume of calls being high or low. We propose a framework that allows us to study the provision of unverifiable information using a unified approach regardless of the type of the announcement. The framework accounts for the following key features: a) the state-of-world changes dynamically; b) the customer cannot verify the information provided by the firm; and c) the customers would process any information provided to them by the firm to base their action on it. The structure that we lay out now covers the suggested framework, and we can allow ourselves not to be restricted to any type of announcements. In particular, it allows us to treat announcements of the variety mentioned above.
To that end, let M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . .} represent the set of feasible signals that the firm can provide to the customer. For example, the set of feasible messages may contain non-negative integers, rational numbers, concrete messages (those with some tangible information) or non-quantifiable messages (those with only intangible information), among others. We can represent the signaling rule by a function g : Z → M, where g(q) = m if the firm uses the signal m when the queue length is q.
Recall that customers are indistinguishable and their strategies are ex-ante symmetric, both in their interpretations of the signals and in their actions. Let y : M → {0, 1} denote the strategy of the customer, where y(m) is the probability that a customer joins when the firm signals m. Consequently, we interpret y(m) = 1 as a "join" decision and y(m) = 0 as a "balk" decision. We initially restrict ourselves to pure strategies.
These already provide valuable insights into the structure of information transmission, while keeping the model simple. We will relax this restrictions in Section 4.
Under a signaling rule g(q) and decision rule y(m), the queue evolves as a birth-death process on the positive integers where for any state q the birth rate is λy(g(q)) and the death rate is µI{q > 0}. Here, we use the notation I{·} to denote the indicator function. Because λ < µ, this birth-death process has a unique steady-state distribution. Let p q (y, g) be the steady-state probability of having q customers in the system.
The requirements of a Markov Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in our context are explained as follows:
Given a signaling rule for the system, customers with an action rule that dictates joining the system when the signal is m will not deviate from this rule if their expected conditional utility, given by E[R − c(q + 1)/µ|g(q) = m], will be negative by doing so. Given the customer's action rule y(m), the firm will not deviate from its signaling rule g(q) if it maximizes its steady-state profit, i.e, if g(q) solves an appropriate the following definition. 
, where W (j + 1) is the time spent by a customer who join the system with j customers, there exist constants J 0 , J 1 , . . . , and γ that solve the following set of equations:
In the above definition of MPBNE, the first condition uses the Bayesian rule for the customer based on the signaling function g to determine whether to join or balk. The second condition states that the composite function y • g solves the admission control type MDP for the firm. In the optimality equations (2), the constant γ represents the long-run average profit made by the firm under optimal policy, and constants
. . represent the relative cost for states 0, 1, . . .; see Chapter 4 in Bertsekas (2001). We shall denote an equilibrium by the pair (y, g).
One of the goals of this paper to identify the conditions under which a firm can credibly communicate unverifiable information. Our litmus test for such credibility will be the existence, or lack thereof, of an informative equilibria. When an informative equilibrium exists, it means that the firm can induce, by virtue of using at least two distinct messages, two distinct actions. Informative equilibrium is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3. 2 We say that an equilibrium (y, g) is informative if there exists two signals m i , m j where
Characterizing key equilibria
While the definition of the pure strategy MPBNE in the previous section is complete, it is not directly amenable for further analysis. Thus, our first step toward characterizing the equilibria is to show that any pure strategy MPBNE can be described using a threshold level. The next proposition shows that such a mapping always exists.
Proposition 3.1 Let the pair (y, g) be a pure strategy MPBNE. If
forms a MPBNE with the same firm profit and customer utility. Further, the system dynamics under both equilibria are identical.
The above result implies that instead of studying the actions taken by customers and the announcement made by the firm in each state of the system (i.e., queue length), we can focus on the threshold queue length, below which the customer's action will be "join," and above which it will be "balk." Note that the equilibria characterized using the Proposition 3.1 requires that the constant N = inf{q : y(g(q)) = 0} be finite. There may exist equilibria where the constant N is infinite. We shall discuss these in Section 3.3.
While every pure strategy MPBNE with finite N is equivalent to a pure strategy MPBNE induced by some threshold, the converse is not true, i.e., not all thresholds induce a pure strategy MPBNE. Indeed thresholds below q * and above a certain level cannot form a pure strategy MPBNE. Thus, given a threshold level, one needs to verify that it indeed induces a pure strategy MPBNE via the functions g and y. Since we frequently use this notion, we formally define it below.
Definition 3.3 We say that the threshold q induces a pure strategy MPBNE if the pair ( g(·), y(·)) given by (3) forms an MPBNE, in which case pair is said to be the induced MPBNE by this threshold.
Before delving into the analysis of the model and the characterization of the equilibrium, we would like to take a step back and develop intuition into the possible regimes and outcomes. In order to do that, and knowing that we can focus on threshold levels, we introduce two important threshold levels: the first, q * , denotes a threshold value above which a customer will not join, if he has full information of the state of the system, and below which he will join. The second threshold level, q, is motivated by the service provider's point of view, and denotes the threshold level below which the service provider would like the customers to join, and above which she would like them to balk, if she had full control of their actions.
Full information.
We will define q * to be the threshold value above which the customers will not obtain positive utility, in expectation, given full queue-length information. It is easy to see that
where [·] is the bracket function; i.e., q * is the largest integer not exceeding Rµ/c. Note that this threshold pertains to the marginal customer who decides to balk. We will refer to this as the first-best from the customer's perspective, as this maximizes the utility for the individual (selfish) customer. As shown in Naor (1969) , this threshold which is based on self-optimization (to use Naor (1969)'s terminology), does not maximize the overall expected utility of the customer population. We denote y F I (q) for all q ≥ 0 as the probability of a customer joining the system when there are q customers in the system and customers have full information. It is worth noting, that the phrase "full information" here is different from the usage in Guo and Zipkin (2007) . The term "full information" here refers to the setting in which the customers has access to the private information (i.e., the state-of-the-system).
Full control. From the service provider's point of view, deciding on a threshold level amounts to deciding what should be the finite waiting space, k, in an M/M/1/k queueing system. For each value of k, the expected number of customers joining the queue per unit of time equals
denote the optimal waiting space. Thus, q solves the following full-control optimization problem:
where W k is the steady-state sojourn time of the customers who join the M/M/1/k queue. The following proposition, which relies on Knudsen (1972) , is given to show that such a maximizer exists, and to discuss the properties of the objective function of the full-control optimization problem faced by the service provider.
Proposition 3.2 The function defined by
is unimodal in k, i.e., there exists k * ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∞} such that the function Π(k) is strictly increasing for
Based on the optimal threshold q we define y F C (q) for all q ≥ 0 as the probability of a customer being admitted to the system when there are q customers in the system and the firm has full control.
Our equilibrium analysis will be based on the level of misalignment between the firm and the cutomers.
To quantify this intuitive concept of misalignment, we make the following definition:
Definition 3. 4 We define φ as the misalignment between the firm and the customers as follows:
Using this misalignment measure φ, which is based on unilateral optimization under full information to the customers and the full control of the service provider respectively, we can identify three regions. Each of these regions results in a different conflict of interest, and thus different equilibria and outcomes for both sides. Figure 3 .2 depicts the different regions and the equilibrium announcements in each one, which we will next discuss. We will initially outline the key equilibrium in each of three regions, and the intuition behind them. The intuition will be followed by a formal statement in Proposition 3.3. The three cases are as follows.
I. Complete alignment: q * = q, that is, the misalignment is zero (φ = 0). In this region, the interests of the two parties are completely aligned, and thus a pure strategy MPBNE is as follows: The firm gives two signals: i) the first for low congestion, which can be denoted as "Low." This signal is announced if the queue length is below q * . ii) A second signal denoted by "High," which indicates high congestion, and is given when the queue length exceeds q * . Thus we have S("Low"|q < q * ) = 1 and S("High"|q ≥ q * ) = 1; the customer joins the queue when he/she receives the signal "Low" and balks otherwise, i.e., y("Low") = "join", y("High") = "balk".
As stated before, this is the key equilibrium in this region; however, this need not be the unique pure strategy MPBNE. As we will show in the sequel, there are multiple equilibria in this model. We will, however, be able to show that each progressively more informative equilibria (see definition in the sequel) is outcome-equivalent to the one described above.
II. Overly patient customers: q * > q, that is the misalignment is strictly positive (φ > 0). In this region, if customers are endowed with full information, they would like to join the system even when the service provider would like them to balk (if she had full control). Thus, we use the term "overly patient" to emphasize the fact that, in this case, customers are willing to join a more congested system than what the firm would like. Specifically, when the queue length is between q and q * , the customers would like to join whereas the firm would like them to balk.
We will show that there is no threshold which is immune to defection by both the customers and the firm and consequently that there is no BNE in pure strategies. Indeed, for pure strategy MPBNE to exist the firm should be able to signal "High" and customers who receive "High" should balk. The only threshold immune to profitable deviation by the firm is q. Given that under any pure strategy MPBNE. the customers respond to "High" by balking, a profitable deviation for the firm from any other candidate threshold is to announce "High" atq. The customers, however, know that q < q * so that q cannot induce an equilibrium: an arriving customer that receives the signal that instructs him to "balk", can deviate from the prescribed equilibrium strategy by joining; the customer will then earn positive utility (since the only state in which he can receive such a signal is on the threshold itself, which is, by assumption, below q * ), and thus detect (on average) that such a deviation is profitable -hence ruling out the possibility of a pure strategy MPBNE.
III. Impatient customers: q * < q, that is the misalignment is strictly negative (φ < 0). In this region, the service provider would like the customers to join a more congested system than the one they wish to join. Specifically, when the queue length is between q * and q, the firm would like the customers to join, whereas the customers would like to balk. In order to study this region, we define F (q) to be the customer's expected utility if he finds q customers in the system upon arrival and decides to join the queue; i.e, F (q) := R − c(q + 1)/µ. We define for < k,
where
is interpreted as the average utility of a customer joining the M/M/1 queue given that the number of customers in the system is between l and k. Then, we have two subcases to consider: a) G(0, q) ≥ 0: if the firm announces "Low" when the queue length is below q and "High" otherwise, the customer would like to join when they get the "Low" signal, as their expected utility is positive (since G(0, q) > 0). Further, since in equilibrium "High" would be announced only when the queue exactly equals q, the customer would balk as they know that q * < q. This is optimal for the firm and also describes our pure strategy MPBNE. for this setting. Thus, the firm is capable of achieving its first best profits and operates as if it has full control over the customer decisions.
b) G(0, q) < 0: In this case there is no threshold-induced pure strategy MPBNE. For pure strategies to exist the firm should be able to signal "Low" and customers who receive "Low" should join. As in case II, the only threshold immune to profitable deviation of the firm is q. However, the customers know that q > q * , thus threshold q cannot constitute an equilibrium; an arriving customer that receives a signal that instructs him to "join" would receive negative expected utility and thus can deviate from the prescribed equilibrium strategy by balking and obtaining zero utility. This rules out the possibility of a threshold-induced pure strategy MPBNE.
The intuition is simple: if the expected utility of the customers under an M/M/1/ q system, as given by G(0, q), is positive, they will have no incentive to deviate. Any deviation here will lead to zero utility for the customers. If, on the other hand, their utility is negative, they would be better-off by not joining at all. Consequently, the threshold q can not induce a pure strategy MPBNE. Further, no other threshold is immune to profitable deviation on the firm's part. Thus, in case III(b) there does not exist a pure strategy MPBNE. We emphasize, however, that in case III(a) the customer can be lured to join the system even in states in which they obtain negative expected utility as long as their utility averaged over all state in which they join is positive. We turn now to the formal statement and proof of the equilibria we have discussed thus far. To this end, we let Π F I and Π F C be the firm's profit under full information and full control respectively. Let U F I and U F C denote the expected utility of the customers under full information and full control, respectively. As discussed before, Π F C is the first-best profit for the firm and U F I is the first-best utility for the customer.
The next proposition summarizes the above result and also compares the firm's profit and expected customer utility under the different equilibria. Social Optimization. We next study how the results discussed apply to the setting where the firm is not a profit-maximizer but is a social planner. In this case, by setting h(w) = cw and v = R, (where c is the disutility experienced by customer due to waiting and R is the value obtained by the customer from service) the system manager's problem amounts to maximizing the social welfare in the system. Using the result from Naor (1969), we have thatq ≤ q * . Thus, in this case, the solution of the first best and full control problem lies in Region I or II. Thus, either the customers are fully aligned and the social planner can announce the true state of the system or there is no pure strategy informative equilibrium. Even though the firms' myopic optimization (based on each customer separately) seems to be aligned with the customer's utility maximizing problem, due to the externalities and the ranking between thresholds, communication between a social planner and customers is impossible in pure strategies.
To summarize our findings so far: we have identified three regions, each with a different equilibrium behavior. We observed that a pure strategy MPBNE exists only if the firm's and the customers' incentives are perfectly aligned or if the customers are mildly impatient. We find that in these equilibria, only a two-signal language is required, thus providing analytical support to the common "high congestion/low congestion" announcement observed in practice. Proposition 3.3 establishes conditions for the existence of pure-strategy informative MPBNE as a function of the system parameters and characterizes these whenever they exist. It also raises two important questions: Are the equilibria outlined above (where they exist) the only equilibria?
Further, does the lack of equilibria (for the appropriate regions) suggests that no equilibrium language whatsoever is possible? (We use the term equilibrium language, in accordance with the usage in the cheap talk literature, to refer to the equilibrium emerging in the cheap talk game. The phrase "language" is used to emphasize the signaling rule and its associated actions.) In answering these two questions we study the following three types of equilibria. First, we show the existence of a babbling equilibria, where the customer disregard any information that the firm provides. Next, we extend the definition of MPBNE to allow customers to randomize their actions. We characterize the non-informative as well as the informative mixed strategy MPBNE. Here, the informative mixed strategy BNE is again a two-signal language. Lastly, we will focus on the most informative equilibria, which will be shown to be equivalent to the two-signal equilibria in terms of system dynamics (which in turn implies that the firm's profit and customers' utilities would be the same under the two equilibria). While other equilibria can be constructed as well, they are equivalent to the two-signal equilibrium.
Babbling equilibrium
The equilibria constructed above are based on a signaling rule with two signals. In practice, however, there are many service providers that share no information whatsoever with the customer, whether it is direct information or one that is implicit in the type of recorded music heard while waiting. Are these systems, where no information is transmitted, in equilibrium? Furthermore, is it possible to have an equilibrium in which the firm does provide information, but due to the lack of its credibility, customers do not follow the firm's recommendation? It turns out that such an equilibrium may indeed exist in our setting. When it does exist, it is referred to as a "babbling" equilibrium (see Farrell and Rabin (1996) ,) to denote that no information is transmitted, or any information provided is treated by the customers as meaningless. We first provide a formal definition of babbling equilibrium.
Definition 3.5
We say that a pure strategy MPBNE equilibirum strategy (y, g) is a pure strategy babbling
The above definition states that the customers are disregarding any information which is provided by the firm, either because the messages provide no information (i.e they are identical) or because the firms lack credibility. In the setting of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , such an equilibrium always exists and it is sometimes the only one. In our model, however, such an equilibrium exists in pure strategies only under the conditions that are in Proposition 3.4 below. In our model, a "babbling equilibrium" exists in pure strategies if, in the absence of information, all customers join (otherwise, given that customers know that all customers balk, they have an incentive to join and earn positive utility). If all customers join, the resulting queueing system is an M/M/1 queue (i.e. with infinite waiting space), in which case the average waiting time is
. In this equilibrium, if indeed all customers join, the system manager can obtain the following profits
Observe that if R < c/(µ − λ), we cannot have a babbling equilibrium. This underscores the difference between the setting of Crawford and Sobel (1982) and our setting. While the uncertainty in Crawford and Sobel (1982) is independent of the equilibrium dynamics, in our setting there is a clear dependence between the uncertainty (as embedded in the steady-state distribution of the queue) and the resulting equilibrium.
This manifests itself in the fact that the babbling equilibrium may not exist. To provide rigorous characterization we have the following result. The following proposition shows that even though a babbling equilibrium may exist, the firm's profit under this equilibrium is dominated by the firm's profit under the two-signal equilibria described in Section 3.2. Further, the overall customer's expected utility is lower under the babbling equilibrium as compared to that achieved under the two-signal equilibrium. Proposition 3.5 emphasizes the value of communication. Even though a non-informative (babbling) equilibria does exist, both the service provider and the customers are better off when they move to more informative equilibria (if such equilibria exist), i.e., to a two-signal equilibria. This communication does not necessarily maximize the customer's overall expected utility but it does improve it. The logic behind Proposition 3.5 is as follows: Naor (1969) shows that when customers are self interested and can observe the length of the queue prior to joining, their optimal threshold q * will be higher than what the social optimum prescribes but it will be finite. In our setting, we observe the threshold queue length for the two-signal equilibrium is at least as high as q * . Further, for the babbling equilibrium, when it exists, the threshold is infinite.
Thus, using information improves the customer's overall expected utility when compared to settings where the service provider is giving no information. Note that this improvement is present in the absence of any verification or credibility of the information provided by the service provider.
At this point, we remind the reader that in the region where the customers are very impatient (region III(b)), there is no pure strategy MPBNE neither informative nor non-informative. Without expanding the strategy set for the customer or the firm, it is unclear how the system would behave in this parameter regime.
In particular, the customer behavior is unpredictable for the service provider. To alleviate this unresolved matter, we next explore the possibility of a MPBNE in which the customers are allowed to randomize.
Does randomization enable communication?
In this section, we will relax the assumption that the customer, given an announcement, either joins with probability 1 or balks with probability 1. In particular we allow the customers to randomize. Towards the definition of MPBNE with this relaxation, as before we use g(q) ∈ M to denote the signal that the firm uses when the queue length is q,for q ∈ Z + , The firm's policy is then given by the function g(·). The customer possible randomization is modeled by allowing y(m) for m ∈ M to take any value in [0, 1]. A value that is strictly in (0, 1) implies that the customer will randomize. That is, if for some m ∈ M, y(m) = p, then the customers will join with probability p whenever given the announcement m, and will balk otherwise. Thus, the action space of the customers is now continuous and uncountable.
probability in the queue with service rate µ and state-dependent arrivals λ(q) = λy(g(q)). 
The key difference between the above definition and the pure strategy MPBNE definition is the condition 1.
Here we allow the customers to randomize if they are indifferent between joining and balking the system.
The potential of signaling strategies that have arbitrary structures can render the analysis of the equilibrium in mixed strategies complex. The next result provide necessary condition on the signaling strategy to constitute a Mixed-Strategies MPBNE.
Proposition 4.1 Let (y, g) be a Mixed-Strategies MPBNE. Then, for any two states q
The immediate implication of the above proposition is that it is never optimal for the firm to use the same signal for two states but use some other signal for a state in between. This is consistent with what we observe in practice, where firms provide information on the waiting time or the number of customers in the queue being between two levels. The above proposition shows that this is indeed the rational choice.
The importance of this result is in showing that a firm will never provide the same signal on two disjoint intervals, and provide a different signal in between.
Babbling equilibrium
We have shown in §3.3 that babbling equilibria need not exist with the restriction to pure-strategies MPBNE.
In contrast, we will now show that, when customers are allowed to use mixed strategies, such equilibria always exist. Moreover, whenever R ≥ c/(µ − λ), the equilibrium is identical to the one characterized in §3.3.
In the complementary case, when R < c/(µ − λ), the customers cannot form a pure strategy MPBNE.
Indeed, if all customers join everyone obtains negative expected utility and not-joining constitutes a profitable deviation. On the other hand, if no one joins, it becomes profitable to deviate by joining the system.
In contrast, when customers can randomize among joining and balking, they can always form a mixed strategy MPBNE as follows: they choose a probability of joining θ that satisfies R = c/(µ − θλ). As R < c/(µ − λ),θ is guaranteed to lie in the interval (0, 1). Under this equilibria, the arrival process is thinned by the customer randomization such that an arriving customer is indifferent between joining and balking. In particular, the customers do not have any profitable deviation. It is easy to see that there is no other randomization strategy that can form a babbling equilibrium in this setting, due to the monotonicity of the function c/(µ − θλ) in θ. We summarize this non-informative MPBNE in the following result. This existence result stands in contrast to what we showed for the pure strategy babbling equilibrium, which need not always exist. Thus, the randomization by customers alleviates the unpredictability of the customer behavior. This suggests in particular, that in absence of any meaningful language between the customer and the firm, the latter can always resort to silence while still predicting customer behavior. The customers however are always weakly better off in any other equilibria.
Informative cheap talk can be viewed as a mechanism to coordinate the incentives of the service provider and the customers when credible information cannot be transmitted. If only babbling equilibrium exists, it might suggest that the non-credibility is hampering any possibility of coordination whatsoever between the players. This is exactly the issue we explore in the next section in which we examine whether there is a possibility of improvement in the coordination between the service provider and its customers.
Mixed strategy informative equilibrium
In this section we show that in addition to the babbling equilibria, there may exist more informative MPBNE in mixed strategies. We will give a complete characterization of these equilibria, but we start by showing that is suffices to consider a certain family of equilibria. In the following proposition we show that, if customers randomize, they will do so only within an interval. Furthermore, we show that balking with probability 1 and joining with probability 1 cannot co-exists. We discuss this structural observation after the statement and proof of the proposition.
Proposition 4.3
Fix a mixed strategy MPBNE and suppose that there is a signal m i such that y(m i ) ∈ (0, 1) and m i
is transmitted with positive probability. Then, there exist q 1 and q 2 , such that the customers join when the number of customers in the system is below q 1 , balk when the number of customers in the system is above q 2 and randomize with a constant parameter, i.e., join the system with probability y(m i ) = θ, whenever the number of customers in the system is between q 1 and q 2 . Furthermore, q 1 and q 2 are such that q * ∈ [q 1 , q 2 ]. Proposition 4.3 implies that there are only two possible types of two-signal mixed strategy MPBNE in which randomization is used. The two types can be described as follows: The firm announces "High" and "Low" based on the threshold q mix , (a) in the first type of MPBNE which we shall refer to as Join or Randomize equilibria, the customers who receive "Low" join the system and the customers who receive "High" would join the system with probability θ ∈ (0, 1) and balk otherwise;(b) in the second type of MPBNE which we shall refer to as Randomize or Balk equilibria, the customers who receive "Low" join the system with probability θ and balk otherwise, and the customers who receive "High" would balk. Both of these equilibria are completely defined by two parameters: the threshold q mix used by the firm for signaling and the randomization parameter θ. We provide a characterization of the pair (q mix , θ) which induces the mixed strategy MPBNE in Appendix B.
Fix a mixed strategy MPBNE and suppose that there exists a signal
In Proposition 3.3, we identified two cases, namely Case II and Case III(b) where the informative pure strategy MPBNE does not exist. Using the characterization in Appendix B, one can verify that for the parameters in case III(b), there always exists a Randomize or Balk mixed strategy MPBNE (up to integrality issues). For case II, however, either type of mixed strategy MPBNE may exist and it is also possible that neither exist but a mixed strategy babbling equilibrium does exist. Note that the firm already achieves first best in Cases I and III(a), thus the firm prefers the pure strategy MPBNE over any other possible mixed strategy MPBNE.
So far, we characterized and proved the existence (or non-existence) of two-signal communication between the firm and its customers that form a MPBNE. We next turn to the question regarding the existence of additional equilibria.
Most Informative Equilibria
As discussed in the introduction, in practice, firms frequently use announcements that are equivalent to the two-signal equilibrium, for example, announcements regarding the congestion of the systems, or the volume of the calls. In this section we show that other types of equilibria, in which more information is provided to the customer, are possible as well. While these equilibria will be different in terms of the firm's announcements, they will be equivalent in terms of the customers' actions, their utility and the firm's profits.
We will introduce the notion of most informative equilibria. This notion will allow us to examine the issue of "truth-telling." Specifically, we study the questions: (a) are there equilibria in which the service provider lies to the customers?; and (b) are there equilibria in which the service provider announces the true state of the system, i.e, equilibria in which the firm uses a signaling rule such that the customers can differentiate between all the states of the system based on the firm's announcement? Due to the strategic nature of the customers, the service provider cannot misrepresent the state of the system (that is, lie to the customer). This does not imply that the provider will announce the true state of the system. Indeed, in answering question (b) above, we will show that, unless the firm and its customers are perfectly aligned (i.e.
Case I), there are no equilibria in which the firm provides a different message for every state. Rather, the provider will use intentional vagueness even under the most informative equilibria (see definition below).
Thus, signaling the true state of the system may not arise in equilibria. Finally, while we focus on the most informative equilibria, we should emphasize that there might be additional equilibria that are in between the two-signal and the most informative ones. Still, these in-between equilibria as well as the most informative equilibria will be equivalent to the two-signal equilibria in terms of utilities of the customers and the service provider's profit and the system dynamics.
The threshold policies defined in Sections 3 and 4 induce an equilibrium that divides the state-space into only two parts, which maybe interpreted as corresponding to "High Load" or "Low Load." As we have shown that this leads to either pure or mixed strategy MPBNE it is not clear that using more detailed information will improve or worsen the outcomes for the firm. We next study is the question: What is the maximum amount of information that the firm is willing to provide to the customers?
To formally examine this question we make the following two definitions: 
Definition 5.2 We say that an ordered set S induces the most informative pure strategy MPBNE, if the following two conditions hold: (a) S induces a mixed strategy MPBNE in the sense of Definition 5.1. (b) Every ordered set S S does not induce a mixed strategy MPBNE.
For the two types of mixed equilibria defined in the previous section, we make the following two definition:
there exists θ such that (q, θ) induces a Join/Randomize type mixed strategy MPBNE.} (7) q RB mix = min{q : there exists θ such that (q, θ) induces a Randomize/Balk type mixed strategy MPBNE.} (8) The following result describes the most informative pure strategy MPBNE. One outcome of Proposition 5.1 is that if the firm is not perfectly aligned with the customers, it will always maintain some level of intentional vagueness. By intentional vagueness we mean that under the most informative equilibrium, the firm provides the same signal on multiple states-of-the-system. This occurs, for example, in case III(a) where the firm is intentionally vague when the state of the system is between q and q so that the customers are lured to the system. If the firm provides any further information in these states, the firm would forgo some of its profits. In case III(a), even though there is information loss, there is no profit-loss by the firm. Further, even though the most informative equilibria could have countably infinite signals (under Randomize/Balk and full alignment), it is important to note that only a finite subset of these are transmitted with strictly positive probability.
Luring the customers for firm's profit. In discussing the opportunities for the service provider to lure a customer to take an action against his best interest we need to distinguish between two types of strategies:
(i) misrepresentation of the state the system is in, and (ii) intentional vagueness. The latter was shown to be not only feasible, but an actual equilibrium that may arise under certain conditions. The former, however, is not possible. There are several reasons for this impossibility that are based on the fact that customers are strategic and thus can detect such a lie, in the same way they can detect a profitable deviation from a strategy profile. To understand this, consider the following two examples: in the first, the firm announces "High" or "Low." The customers can evaluate what each one of these mean, and act accordingly. Flipping the message or signaling any other message will not earn the service provider any additional profits. Moreover, as shown above, the announcements have to correspond to the threshold levels that are described above in order to constitute an equilibrium. Thus, even if the firm is trying to lie by deviating from the equilibrium threshold, this will be detected by an arriving customer, on average. In a second example, if the firm provides a signal with the number of customers in line, the customers can detect any misrepresentation, and map the signal to its right meaning, on average. Note that the feasibility of the intentional vagueness is due to the fact that this type of a lie is not detectable, since the customer knows the set of states in which he arrived, but not the specific state, if the resulting action is joining.
Discussion
Abandonment-Proofness
In many service settings, customers can make a decision not only regarding joining vs. balking but also about leaving the system in between (abandon). So far, we focussed on the first two decisions, while disallowing customer abandonment. In this section we show that if the customers are allowed to update their belief about the system and renege the queue, the equilibria characterized above will continue to hold.
Proposition 6.1 In the equilibria identified in Propositions 3.3 and 4.3, a rational customer will not abandon even if allowed to and the firm will not deviate from its signaling rule. In this sense, these equilibria are
The above result states that a rational customer who updates his belief on the state of the system after joining the system, would not abandon. We show that even if the customers solve an optimal stopping time problem, since the hazard rate of the waiting time distribution is increasing, he will not abandon once he joined the system. The reasoning is that while indeed the customer might learn the fact that he was lured to join in a state he otherwise would not join, he is in a better position compared to the one in which he decided to join. Since it is optimal for him to "let bygones, be bygones," and regard the time elapsed as sunk cost, it will be better for him to stay on in the system. Moreover, when the customers can leave the system after joining, before the commencement of their service, one can show that the full control solution outline in Section 3 will not change. That is the firm would not be interested in allowing a customer to join and then leave the system before he gets served, and thus will not provide signals that will allow for such a behavior. In Crawford and Sobel (1982) , the receiver of the information cannot verify the state of the world until the game is completed and payoffs are received. However, in many service systems the customer may be able to update his beliefs on the information by joining the system. Our result above shows that even when the customer has a recourse action (to abandon the system) after updating his beliefs, the structure of the equilibria is based on the first time instance of the interaction.
Hence, in this setting rational abandonments will not arise endogenously. Other more complex settings, such as the one in which the valuation varies over time (see Hassin and Haviv (1997) ) or one in which the customers feel that they have been left out of the system without being informed (see Mandelbaum and Shimkin (2000) ), can lead to rational abandonments.
Numerical Study: Tatonnement equilibira with pure strategies
In this section we use a numerical study to illustrate how the different equilibria can be reached via a Tâtonnement scheme in which customers adaptively yet myopically learn how to map the signal of the firm to their action so as to maximize their utilities.
We consider a multi-period setting of our cheap talk game. In each period, the customers use their past experience to decide how to respond to various messages given by the firm. Customers start with arbitrary beliefs regarding the meaning of the messages and the signaling rules the firm uses. The firm, knowing how the customers respond to these signals in each period, uses these signals to maximize profit. Thus, in any period the strategy of the firm can be computed using an MDP (as in Condition 2 of Definition 3.1).
The updating mechanism used by the customers is as follows: in period n the probability of joining after receiving a signal m i is given by:
where U n−1 (m i ) denotes the expected utility obtained by the customers when the firm announces m i in period n − 1. Also, we assume that the length of each period is sufficiently long so that the system reaches its steady-state. For the purpose of the above described updating mechanism, we shall use the expected steady-state utilities obtained by the customers. The updating rule outlined in (9) is similar to exponential smoothing with the weight assigned to the present (vs. the past) being equal to the proportion in which the state-of-the world was sampled when received the signal m i . This can also be thought of as a best response to the signaling rule of the firm, where only those observing the state of the system are capable of updating their beliefs.
While other more effective ways to teach the customers may exist, we use a simple, myopic learning scheme, following Kalai et al. (1993) . The goal of this numerical study is merely to illustrate how the different equilibria (or lack there of) in this paper may be reached using a simple iterative process even when the customer having no a-priori knowledge of the meaning of the messages, the equilibrium strategies, or even the properties of the queueing system.
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We consider three sets of parameters, each with non-zero misalignment. These sets correspond to Regions II, IIIa and IIIb. In the first, we use the following parameters: The arrival rate of the customers is 1 customer per unit of time. The service rate is 2 customers per unit of time. The firm earns a value of 10 from each customer served, and incurs an holding cost of 1 per customer per unit of time. The customer on the other hand obtains a reward of 5 from service and incurs a disutility of 1 per unit of time from waiting. The customers begin with subjective beliefs that any signal should result in joining with probability 1/2 and balking with probability 1/2. The firm begins with the following strategy: it signals m 1 whenever the queue length is below 25, and signals m 2 otherwise. (Note that under this customers initial subjective belief, the firm is indifferent among all thresholds.) For these parameters, we compute the probabilities of joining for signals m 1 and m 2 for the customer using (9) and the optimal response for the firm in periods 1, ...20. The customers update their beliefs that the firm uses signal m i when it is beneficial for them to join. (As one can observe when the firm uses signal m 1 for the low states of the system, the customers' probability of joining based on their belief converge to 1, while for signal m 2 it converges to zero.) Tatonnement scheme for Region II, the case of non-informative equilibrium. The probability of joining for message m1 and message m2 converge to 1.
In the next example we modify only the reward obtained by the customers to R = 10. As described in Section 3.2, when the parameters for the customer and firm are equals, i.e., v = R and h = c, the solution (q * ,q) lies in region I or II. In this specific setting, the solution falls in region II, so there is no informative equilibrium. We again plot the the probability of joining for the signals m 1 and m 2 in each period 1, . . . , 8.
We observe that the firm cannot create any credibility with regard to the signals and eventually, customers simply join the system regardless of the message used by the firm. As demonstrated in Proposition 3.4, the only non-informative pure strategies equilibrium is one in which all customers join the system. Tatonnement scheme for Region IIIb, the case of no equilibrium. The probability of joining for both message m1 and message m2 oscillates.
In the next example we modify only the reward obtained by the customers to R = 0.9. The solutions to the full control and full information problems (q * ,q) lie in Region IIIb. As shown in Propositions 3.4 and 3.3, there is neither a pure strategies non-informative nor a pure strategies informative MPBNE equilibria. As one can observe, the iterative process does not converge. In this case the firm does establish credibility with respect to either signals. We observe whenever the probability of joining gets high the firm in an attempt to maximize profit myopically use a threshold close toq. Given that the system lies in Region IIIb, however, the expected utility of the customer is negative and thus they would not like to join the system. However, if no one joins the system, then the congestion is so low that everyone wants to join to increase their utilities.
This leads to the oscillatory behavior in figure 6.2.
Comparison of our results with classical cheap talk model
In this section, we contrast the key conclusions of our cheap talk model with the classical Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. To do this effectively, we summarize the classical cheap talk game and its result.
The static game in Crawford and Sobel is played between a sender who has some private information and a receiver who takes the payoffs-relevant actions. Both the sender and the receiver obtain utilities which depend on: (a) the action taken by the receiver, y; (b) the state of the world Q. We denote the utility of the sender by π(y, Q) = −(y − (Q − b)) 2 , and the receiver's by U (y, Q) = −(y − Q) 2 . In this setting, the receiver would take the action Q if the receiver has full information; and if the sender has full control, has preferred action is Q − b. Thus, using our definition, the misalignment in this setting equals b.
Comparison of Key Results. For the classical cheap talk game, there always exists an equilibrium where no information is transmitted from the sender to the receiver, irrespective of the parameters of the problem.
In fact this is the only equilibrium when |b| exceeds 1/4. In contrast, when b is less than 1/4, informative equilibria do exist. It is worthwhile noting that in this game, if the sender can commit to fully reveal the state-of-world, then both parties would be better off than in any other equilibrium. Informally, the key takeaway from Crawford and Sobel is the fact that in the absence of any commitment mechanisms, the fact that the talk is cheap (and unverifiable) leads to information loss.
We would like to highlight the following key differences between the outcome of our game and the classical cheap talk game:
1. In our model, by Proposition 5.1 it is never advisable for the firm to provide full information, even if it could have committed to fully reveal the state of the system, unless the firm and the customers are fully aligned (that is, if the misalignment is 0.) Hence, there are two reasons for the firm to shade information: first, to lure customers to join in states in which they would otherwise balk had they known the real state of the system and, second, in order to create credibility, for example by inducing mixed strategies equilibrium.
While the latter purpose is analogous to the benefit of shading information in Crawford and Sobel (1982) , the former is novel to our operational settings where the optimal full control solution exhibits a "bangbang" solution. From the above, it may seem that there is a tension between the firm and the customer, i.e., when the firm tries to improve its profit by moving from a non-informative to an informative equilibrium by luring customers, the customer may lower their overall utility. However, it is surprising that by providing information there are situations where the firm can create credibility and also improve not only itself but also the customer's utility! 2. In our model, the existence (or non-existence) of the equilibrium depends not only on the magnitude of the misalignment, but also on the direction. While the existence of an equilibrium in the classical cheap talk model depends only on the magnitude |b|. In contrast in our case whether q * −q is positive or negative is crucial in determining whether an equilibrium exists or not. This is due to the different levels of detectability associated with the different actions -by joining the system when "recommended" to balk, the customer can potentially detect the true state of the world; however, by balking when "asked" to join, the customer does not gain any information. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the model of a service system where customers are not only strategic in their actions but also in the way they interpret information. Also, the service provider is strategic in the way she provides information. We show that even though the information is costless, unverified and non-credible, it can improve the outcome for all players. Through a stylized model, we are able to provide a theoretical basis for intentional vagueness on the part of the service provider. The developed framework allows us to provide a rational explanation for seemingly odd announcement conventions. For example, a call center of a medium-sized bank in Israel 6 serving customers via N agents would make the following announcements to a customer joining when there are q customers in queue: "You are the The framework used in the paper echoes the cheap-talk model proposed in Crawford and Sobel (1982) .
Driven by the application to services, we proposed a model that has two novel features: First, the model considers multiple receivers (customers) whose actions have externalities on other receivers. Second, the stochasticity of the type (i.e., state of the system) is not exogenously given but is determined by the equilibrium strategies of the players. We show that these have non-trivial impacts on the structure of the equilibrium.
Throughout this paper, we assumed that the queue is Markovian and that there is a single server. The results in the paper are extendable to the case of multiple servers and general renewal arrival processes.
Another assumption which can be relaxed is the assumption that λ < µ (i.e., demand is less than supply).
The structure provided in the paper also holds for λ > µ.
An extension of the model that is worth exploring is the scenario where the firm engages in "delayed cheap talk," that is, the firm makes announcements to the customer after some delay but before the completion of the service. The framework developed in this paper can be applied to other operations management settings where the customers cannot credibly verify the information provided to them. Allon and Bassamboo (2008) studies such a setting where a retailer signals strategic information to the potential buyers.
function Π(·). Further, the threshold levelq does not satisfy the first condition in the Definition 4.1. To see this, assume that it does induce a pure strategy MPBNE. Then, in the corresponding pure strategy MPBNE we have two signals: m 1 standing for "Low" and m 2 standing for "High" and in order to satisfy condition 1 of the pure strategy MPBNE, we need to have that that y(m 1 ) = 1 and y(m 2 ) = 0. But, asq < q * , we have that
where the first equality follows from the fact that if the thresholdq induces a pure strategy MPBNE then N in Definition 3.1 isq. Consequently, we would have that y(m 2 ) = 1 and the thresholdq can not induce a pure strategy MPBNE.
III.
(a) If q * < q and G(0, q) ≥ 0, then F ( q) ≤ 0, and thus the proposed pure strategy MPBNE satisfies the first condition in the definition of pure strategy MPBNE. Also, using the optimality of q, we get that it satisfies the second condition in the definition of pure strategy MPBNE.
(b) Suppose that q * < q and G(0, q) < 0. Let q := inf{q ∈ Z + : G(0, q) ≤ 0}. Now, any threshold strategy with a threshold that is greater than q cannot satisfy the first condition in the definition of pure strategy MPBNE (Definition 3.1). The monotonicity of Π(·) on [0,q] (see Proposition 3.2) implies that any strategy obtained from a threshold that is strictly smaller thanq cannot satisfy the second condition in the definition of pure strategy MPBNE. Lastly, we can see that the threshold strategy with threshold q does not satisfy the second condition in the definition of pure strategy MPBNE conditions. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4:
The first part of the result follows directly from the discussion above. We now turn to region III(b) and show that the babbling equilibrium does not exist as a customer always has a profitable deviation.
Recall that G(0, k) is the customer's utility from joining a M/M/1/k queue. Similar to Proposition 4.2, it can be shown that G(0, k) is monotone decreasing in k. Hence, the customers utility under the babbling equilibrium is equal to lim k→∞ G(0, k) and bounded above by G(0, q), which is negative. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.5:
We first focus on regions I and III(a). Recall that by the definition of q and the unimodality of the firm's profit function Π(·) (see Proposition 3.2), we have that the firm's profit is decreasing over the region [ q, ∞). Further, appealing to Proposition 3.3 for regions I and III(a), we have that the threshold that induces the equilibrium is higher than q. Consequently, using the fact that π ni = lim k→∞ Π(k), we have that the firm's profit in any of these regions is greater than or equal to the babbling equilibrium. A similar argument is applied to the customer's expected utility. Let the overall customers' expected utility be maximized at a point q SO . Using Section 4 from Naor (1969), we have that the expected overall utility of the customers is unimodal in q and q SO < q * . Also, we have that the threshold that induces the equilibrium in Proposition 3.3 is higher than q * . This completes the proof for regions I and III (a).
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Focussing on the MDP (condition 2) in Definition 4.1 of Mixed-Strategies MPBNE, and using the arguments similar to those used in Section 2 of Stidham and Weber (1989) we have that the function J q is strictly convex. Letq g,y = inf{q : J q+1 − J q + f (q) ≤ 0}. Note that due to the strict convexity of J q and monotonicity of f , the set {q : J q+1 − J q + f (q) = 0} is either empty or equals {q g,y }. Note that the condition 2, requires that g(q) ∈ arg max m∈M y(m)(J q+1 − J q + f (q)). Thus, for (y, g) to be equilibrium, it must be the case that:
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.3:
1. Fix a mixed strategy MPBNE with y(m i ) ∈ (0, 1). Further, without loss of generality we assume y(m 2 ) ∈ (0, 1).
Let p q (y, g) be the induced steady state of the probability that there are q customers in the system under the mixed strategy MPBNE (y, g). Using the definition of the mixed strategy MPBNE. There exists q 1 and q 2 such that the firm's signals m 2 if the queue length is between q 1 and q 2 . Further, since the customers are randomizing it must be the case that the customers are indifferent between joining and not joining. Thus, we have that
Further, the firm signals m i where i = 2, for some interval [q a , q b ], using the definition of mixed MPBNE it must be the case that q a > q * or q b < q * . Thus, for any signal m i , the expected utility of the customers would be either strictly positive or strictly negative depending on whether q b < q * or q a > q * , respectively.
Thus, for all other signals the customers will join with probability one or balk with probability one. This completes the proof.
2. By Proposition 4.1 it suffices to consider signals that are announced on intervals. That immediately implies that any equilibrium can be reduced to an equilibrium with three signals. Further, two of these signals must correspond to pure Join and pure Balk. Using the MDP approach, we know that for a given customer strategy that there exists a solution which is threshold type. There are two cases to be considered here: a) There is no state on which the firm is indifferent, in this case the firm would try to obtain its first best and use only two signals due to a bang-bang solution for the MDP.
b) If the firm is indifferent in action on one or more state. Using the arguments in Proof of Proposition 4.1 it must be the case that the firm is indifferent at exactly one state. Letq denote this state. Thus, the only equilibrium with three signal language possible in this case is if the firm signals Join on lower states (strictly less thanq) and Balk on higher states (strictly greater thanq), and randomize onq. Note that the customer would then randomize when they receive the signal randomize only if R − c(q + 1)/µ = 0. For this to be an equlibrium, it must be the case that the parameters of the region lie in Region I. Thus, there cannot be a three signal equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5.1:
I.Note that we cannot partition the set Z + further. The proof then follows directly as the set Z + induces the pure strategy MPBNE described in Proposition 3.3 (I).
II.(a-c)
The proof follows from the definition of q JR mix and q RB mix and noting that if the the identified set is partitioned further, it will not a MPBNE using Proposition 4.3.
III. a) Clearly, this set induces the pure strategy MPBNE described in Proposition 3.3 for case III(a). It suffices to show that we can not partition the set S such that the resulting induces a mixed or pure strategy MPBNE.
We focus first on pure strategies. To reach a contradiction, assume that there exists a set S S that induces a pure strategy MPBNE. Then, there is q withq < q <q, such that the customers receive a different signal on [q, q ) then on [q ,q). But, by the definition ofq and condition 1 of the pure strategy MPBNE.(see Definition 3.1), the customers would not join given the signal on [q ,q). Moreover, since Π(·) is strictly monotone increasing for q ≤q (see Proposition 3. 2) and since there exists, by Proposition 3.3, a pure strategy MPBNE induced by thresholdq, the firm would be better off deviating.
Lastly, we shall focus on mixed strategies. To arrive at contradiction, assume that there exists a set S S that induces a mixed strategy MPBNE. Using proposition 4.3, there could only be two types of equilibria. It is easy to note that this mixed strategy equilibria must be of type Randomize/Balk. Let the parameter for this mixed strategy MPBNE be (q mix , θ) where 0 < θ < 1. Given that S S, it is easy to see that q mix < q. Further, it must be the case that q := arg max {q : G(q, q) > 0} = 0. Define q = arg max{q : G(0, q) > 0}. Note that q ≥ q. From Appendix B, we further know that R − c q mix −1 q=0 p θ,q mix+1 µ = 0. Thus, we have that q mix ≥ q ≥ q leading to a contradiction.
Thus, the set {0, 1, 2, . . ., q, q, q + 1, . . .} induces the most informative pure strategy MPBNE.
b) The argument is very similar to part II.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. The structure of the equilibria described in Lemma A.1 and A.2 (which are stated below with their proofs) implies that conditioned on joining and the information received by the customer, the waiting time in the queue has an increasing hazard rate. Using the arguments similar to the proof of Proposition 2(i) in Mandelbaum and Shimkin (2000), we obtain that the customers will never abandon the system if they join the system. This shows that the equilibria described earlier are abandonment-proof from the customer's perspective. Given, that the customers do not abandon, and the firm had no profitable deviation from its signaling rule, it follows that the firm will not have any profitable deviation when the customers are allowed to deviate. This completes the proof.
Lemma A.1
In an M/M/1/N system, the waiting time of the customer has an increasing hazard rate.
Proof:
In an M/M/1/N system using the steady state analysis and the PASTA property the number of customers in the system when a customer arrives and joins the system has a geometric distribution conditioned on it being less than N .
Thus, we have that the waiting time in the system for a customer has the same distribution as Q+1 j=1
X j , where X j are exponential with mean 1/µ and Q has the same distribution as the number in system of M/M/1/N conditioned on the event that the number of customer is less than N . We also, know that the Q + 1 has an increasing hazard rate.
Using Theorem 7.1 in Ross et al. (2005) , we have that the waiting time will also have an increasing hazard rate. This completes the proof. Proof: In Proposition 3.4 we proved that a pure-strategy babbling equilibrium exists if and only if R ≥ c/(µ − λ).
We recall, however, that in the Randomize or Balk equilibrium with threshold and randomization constant (q mix , θ), the customers are indifferent between joining and balking and, in particular, the pair (q mix , θ) satisfies (13). Consequently, if the buffer size increases to infinity while keeping the arrival rate θλ the utility will become negative and the customers will not join the system. In turn, we must have that R < c µ − θλ < c µ − λ , which contradicts the condition for pure-strategy babbling equilibrium.
We now turn to Join or Randomize equilibria.
B.2. Join or Randomize
Let (q mix , θ) induce a mixed strategy MPBNE i.e, the firm announces "Low" if the queue length is less than q mix and "High" otherwise. The customer joins with probability 1 if he receives the signal "Low". If, on the other hand, he receives the signal "High", then he joins with probability θ and balks otherwise.
Towards the characterization of the equilibrium in this case we note first that, given the signal "High", the average expected waiting time of a customer that decides to join is given by
For the equilibrium to be immune to any profitable deviation by the customers, then that (q mix , θ) must satisfy the following condition:
so that customers will be indifferent between joining and balking. Indeed, condition (15) ensures that the customer's expected utility by joining is zero, which is the same as his expected utility if he decides to balk. Note that for any θ ∈ (0, 1) the solution q mix of the above condition is less than q * ; thus, if the customer receives the signal "High", he would obtain a strictly positive expected utility by joining.
Finally, for this equilibrium to be immune to any profitable deviation by the firm, we must have that, given θ, q mix is the optimal "switching-point" for the firm, where the switching is between an arrival rate of λ to one of θλ. In other words,
Here,p θ,k q is the steady-state distribution of a state-dependent M/M/1 queue with arrival rate λ(q) = λ for all q < k and arrival rate λ(q) = θλ for all q ≥ k.
